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Abstract
We introduce a generalization of Hadamard and the controlled not gates which
together with the generalized Bell states, enable us to introduce new methods
for quantum key distribution (QKD) of d-level quantum states (qudits). In case
of eavesdropping, an error rate of d−1d is introduced in Bob’s received qudits, so
that for large d, comparison of only a tiny fraction of received qudits with the
sent ones detect the presence of Eve.






As far as classical computation and classical communication are concerned, binary
units of memory and binary logic gates play an inevitable and natural role due to the
inherent simplicity of Boolean algebra on the one hand and their compatibility with
states of electronic devices on the other hand. With such classical gates as NOT,
AND, and OR, the simplest logical operations with which we are familiar in everyday
life, can be implemented. They are also quite simple to design electronically. How-
ever in quantum computation and communication (see [1, 2] and references therein),
the main resources that have the potential of surpassing our conventional classical
methods, are quantum parallelism (for massive computation), non-locality and en-
tanglement (for communication) and uncertainty relations (e.g. for Quantum Key
Distribution among other things). For utilizing these resources, two level quantum
states are not inevitable. Only considerations of quantum hardware should decide
between using 2-level or multi level states. At present a major diculty in quantum
computation is the limit on the number of qubits that can be coupled experimentally
[3]. The use of d-dimensional systems or qudits has the advantage that compared
to qubits fewer systems should be coupled to obtain a given dimensionality of the
Hilbert space, although it may be easier to construct universal gates for qubits than
for qudits. In view of this, some aspects of quantum computation have been studied
also for d−level systems, like consideration of quantum gates for qudits [4], quantum
error correcting codes [5, 6], and generalization of the BB84 protocol [7] for quantum
key distribution[8]. (For a review on quantum key distribution see [9].)
There has even been a lot of activity in formulating various algorithms and protocols
for continuous variables (see [10, 11] and referenced therein).
In any case, we will gain more insight into the methods and algorithms of quantum
computation and communication, if we study these methods for general d-level sys-
tems, in a uniform manner so that by going to specic limits we can recover the
familiar results of 2-level systems or the results for continuous variables.
In this paper we are mainly concerned with a method of quantum key distribution
based on d-level states, although in the way of studying this, we have derived other
results about some simple algorithms, which we will present in the appendix.
The QKD scheme of BB84 [7] for qubits and its generalization to three level states
or qutrits [12, 13] and to general d-level states in [8] are based on dening the key
partly in the various choices of the bases chosen by Alice and Bob for encoding and
decoding the dierent bits or dits. There are also QKD protocols for two level systems
based on shared entanglement [14, 15], in which non-local properties of entanglement
are exploited to secure information transfer.
Our aim in this article is to propose a quantum key distribution scheme for d-level
systems, based on a protocol proposed in [15]. The key elements of our work is a
generalization of the Hadamard gate and the CNOT gate for d-level systems. We
will also use the generalized bell states recently introduced in [16]. We will show that
by suitable manipulations of the qudits (unitary transformations), Alice and Bob can
communicate securely a secret key, and can detect the presence of an eavesdropper
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by comparing with each other, only a tiny fraction of their sent and received qudits.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we rst review some known
facts about the generalized Bell states, and then introduce the analogs of CNOT and
the Hadamard gates for qudits. In section 3 we introduce the QKD scheme for d-level
systems, where we also discuss one method of attack and the way around it. In section
4 which concludes the paper, we discuss a possible route to generalizing our results
to the continuous variables. In the appendix we will state some further results on
qudit computation and communication which are not directly related to the body of
the paper, but we think are worth while of attention.
2 States, and Gates for d-level Systems
For qudits, a generalization of the familiar Bell states, has been introduced in [16].
These are a set of d2 maximally entangled states which form an orthonormal basis





ζnjjj, j + mi (1)
where ζ = e
2pii
d and m and n run from 0 to d − 1. These states have the properties
hΨm,njΨm′,n′i = δn,n′δm,m′ (orthonormality) and trace2(jΨm,nihΨm,nj) = 1dI(maximal
entanglement). The following operators, rst dened in [16] are also useful, since they




ζnjjj + mihjj (2)
For example, given the entangled state jΨ0,0i, only one of the parties, say Alice, can
generate any Bell state jΨm,ni by acting on jΨ0,0i with Um,n, i.e:
(I ⊗ Um,n)jΨ0,0i = jΨm,ni (3)
One should however note that contrary to the Pauli operators, the operators Um,n
are not necessarily Hermitian.
We now dene a generalization of Hadamard gate which turns out to be quite useful







where ζ = e
2pii
d . This operator is really not new and it is known as the quantum
Fourier transform when d = 2n. In that case it acts on n qubits. Here we are
assuming it to be a basic gate on one single qudit, in the same way that the ordinary










Figure 1: Circuit identity for d-level gates
(HH = I), but not hermitian.
To generalize the NOT and the CNOT gates, we note that in the context of qudits,
the NOT gate, is basically a mod-2 adder. For qudits this operator gives way to a
mod-d adder, or a Right-Shift gate,
Rjji = jj + 1i mod d (5)
R−1jji  Ljji = jj − 1i mod d, (6)
where L has been used to denote a left shift. Note that Rd = I, compared to
NOT 2 = I. For every unitary operator U the controlled gate Uc which acts on the
second qudit conditioned on the rst qudit is naturally dened as follows:
Uc(jii ⊗ jji) = jii ⊗ U ijji (7)
Note the dierence with the qubit case. In the qubit case a controlled operator acts
only if the value of the rst bit is 1, here it acts i times if the value of the rst qudit
is i. (Sometimes it is said that a controlled operator is like an if statement in classical
computation [1]. If we take this statement literally, then a controlled operation for
d-level states acts like a loop.) In particular the controlled shift gates which play the
role of CNOT gate, act as follows:
Rcji, ji = ji, j + ii Lcji, ji = ji, j − ii (8)
Every function f from f0, 1,    , d − 1gn ! f0, 1,    , d − 1gm is made reversible by
the denition fr(x,y) = (x, f(x) + y) where all additions are performed mod d. In
quantum circuits such a function is implemented by a unitary operator Uf jx,yi :=
jx, f(x) + yi where x 2 f0, 1,    , d− 1gn and y 2 f0, 1,    , d− 1gm. Note that here
and in all that follows addition of multi dits is performed dit-wise and mod d.
Quite analogously to the q-bits, the Hadamard and the Controlled Shift gates can
generate all the Bell states fjΨm,nig from the computational basis states fjm,nig:
Rc(H ⊗ I)jn,mi = jΨm,ni (9)
Many other properties of these gates are simply carried over from the case of q-bits
to the general case with appropriate modications. For example one can check the
validity of the circuit identity in g. (1).
4
3 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum Key distribution with the original protocol of BB84, has already been gen-
eralized to the d-level case in [8]. Here our method of Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD), is based on an idea rst put forward in [15]. In this type of QKD, the two
parties say Alice and Bob, use a reusable entangled state (EPR pair), to encode and
decode their classical data. A third party say Eve, who tries to eavesdrop the data,
will have no access to the information and moreover its presence will be detected by
Alice and Bob.
The starting point of this protocol is the sharing of a Bell state jΨ00i = 1pd
∑d−1
j=0 jj, ji
by Alice and Bob. The qudit to be sent is denoted by q. The basic idea neglecting
considerations of Eve’s attack for now, is that Alice performs a controlled-right shift







jj, j, q + jia,b,q. (10)
She then sends the qudit to Bob. At the destination, Bob performs a controlled-left
shift on the qudit and disentangles it from the Bell state, hence revealing the value
of q with certainty.
A possible conceivable attack by Eve(e) is that she entangles her state to those of
Alice(a), Bob(b) and the qudit(q) so that after Bob measurement of the qudit, she can
obtain partial information about the qudit. The best way to describe and visualize
the protocol is to refer to g. (2), where the qudits are drawn as lines and states at
each stage are shown explicitly.
The strategy that Eve follows should be described separately for the rst qudit and
the rest of the qudits. For the rst qudit, she performs no measurement and proceeds
so that her qudit gets entangled with the the Bell state of Alice and Bob at the end of
the process. For this she uses a controlled right-shift on her qudit conditioned on the
value of the rst qudit being sent (see g. (2)). The states at various stages are as
follows, where in each ket the qudits refer respectively from left to right to Alice(a),


















jj, j, q1 + j, q1 + jia,b,q,e (13)
(14)
In the last stage when Bob performs his Left-Shift he disentangles the qudit from the

























Figure 2: Eve attack for the rst qudit






jj, j, q1 + jiabe (15)
Note that this is what Eve does only for the rst qudit. For the next qudits she
modies her strategy by rst performing a left-shift, measuring her qudit and then
performing a right-shift on her qudit. The rest of the process is like that for the rst



















jj, j, q2 + j, q1 − q2ia,b,q,e (18)
(19)
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Figure 3: Eve attack for next qudits
It is now clear that Bob can measure as before the state of the qudit q2, however
Eve has also been able to obtain the value q1 − q2, while the nal Bell state of Alice
and Bob is again entangled with that of Eve in the form (15). This state can again
be used for the other qudits of the sequence. In this way Eve intercepts the qudits
q1 − q2, q1 − q3, q1 − q4, etc, from which she can infer all the sequence by checking d
possible values for q1..
To protect this protocol against this kind of attack, Alice and Bob proceed as follows:
They act on their shared Bell state by the Hadamard gates H and H, respectively.
The key point is that a Bell state disentangled from the outside world is unchanged
under this operation
(H ⊗H)jΨ0,0i = jΨ0,0i. (23)
In fact the shared state is unchanged under more general operators of the form U⊗U,
where U is any unitary operator. However as we will see, the best choice of U
is the Hadamard gate. It is clear from g. (2), that for the rst qudit nothing
changes. However for the second qudit and other qudits, essential changes occur in
the intermediate states in the process. As we will see, in this way Alice and Bob can
prevent Eve from getting any useful information from entangling her state to that







jj, j, q2, j + q1ia,b,q,e (24)








k,jji, k, q2, j + q1ia,b,q,e (25)

















k,jji, k, i + q2, j + q1 − i− q2ia,b,q,e (27)
(28)
Note that if Eve now measures her qudit, she will not obtain q1 − q2 anymore but a
variety of qudits with probabilities that we will show to be equal. In this way Alice
and Bob prevent Eve from getting any information about the value of q1 − q2 by her
entanglement process. To analyze the security of this protocol against this type of
attack, we have to calculate a number of conditional probabilities. The notations have
the standard meanings, i.e: PEve(qjq1, q2) denotes the probability of Eve measuring
her qudit to be q, provided that the rst and the second qudits sent, have been q1
and q2 respectively. Simple calculations show that








where we have used the unitarity of H. This then means that Eve’s probability
distribution for measurement of the second qudit is completely flat (her density matrix
is ρEve = 1dI) and she gains no information by intercepting the key in this type
of attack. When Eve measures her qudit to be q, the normalized state after her
measurement will be:





k,i+q2−q1+qji, k, i + q2, qi (30)






k,i+q2−q1+qji, k, i + q2 − k, i + q + q2i (31)
Thus the conditional probability of Bob measuring the state of the received qudit to
be b, provided that the rst and the second qudits have been q1 and q2 and Eve has
measured her qudit to be q, will be:







One can now determine the probability of Bob measuring the second qudit to be b,
provided that the qudit q2 has been sent. Assuming that Alice sends all the qudits
with equal probability (PAlice(q2) = 1d ) We have:






PBob(b, q, q2, q1) = d
∑
q1,q





PBob(bjq, q2, q1)PEve(qjq2, q1)PAlice(q2, q1) (33)
Assuming that the consecutive qubits sent by Alice are not correlated, we have








This then means that Eve’s intercepting causes a high rate of error in the trans-
mission of the key, specially if we use high dimensional or even continuous states.
Therefore by comparing only a small fraction of their key, Alice and Bob can ascer-
tain the presence of a third party intercepting their communication. In case they
detect no intercepting, they should only discard a tiny portion of their key. In case
Alice and Bob act by the local operator U ⊗ U for any unitary operator, on their
initial Bell state, they can still run this protocol with success, and a repetition of the
above calculations on conditional probabilities show that the probability of error for
Bob will be 1− 1d
∑d−1
i,j=0 jUi,j j4. Choosing the Hadamard gate for U , is in a sense the
optimum choice, in that it maximizes the above probability.
4 Discussions
There has been a lot of interest toward quantum computation and quantum com-
munication with continuous variables in the past couple of years (see [10, 11] and
references therein), where instead of bits, information may be stored in innite di-
mensional states like position or momentum of a particle or amplitude of an electro-
magnetic eld. Part of this interest derives from the fact that it has been shown that a
combination of optical devices like phase shifters and beam splitters may be sucient
to act as a set of universal gates. Therefore many algorithms and protocols have been
re-studied for continuous variables [11]. Now that we have a QKD protocol for d-level
states for any d, a natural question arises whether it is possible to go to a proper
continuous limit and dene the above process for continuous variables. Naively one




eiβxjx, x + αi (35)
where α and β are continuous labels ranging from −1 to +1 and jxi is a continuous
state like position and all the integrals now and hereafter are over the real line. These
states are normalized in the sense that
hΨα,βjΨα′,β′i = δ(α − α0)δ(β − β0) (36)
and are maximally entangled in the sense that trace2(jΨα,βihΨα,βj) / I. The general-
ization of the Hadamard operator is nothing but the Fourier transform operator which
9






The controlled right shift operator now takes the form
Rcjx, yi = jx, x + yi (38)
which as an operator takes the particularly simple form
Rc = e−iX⊗P (39)
However using these continuously labeled states in the protocol one runs into diculty
in computing various probabilities, due to their ill-dened normalization. One possible
solution may be to rst dene a innitely countable set of bell states for two particles
in a box. This however is not an easy task.
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Figure 4: Teleportation using the generalized Bell states
Appendix
The problems discussed in the appendix are of minor importance and are only pre-
sented to show that almost all the simple algorithms and protocols can be generalized
to the d-level case.
5.1 Teleportation Using the generalized Bell states
Using the Hadamard and controlled -shift gates one can also teleport d−dimensional
states exactly in the same manner for 2− level bits. The circuit is shown in g. (4),
where the rst line shows the state of the particle and the second and the third lines
show respectively the states of Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob are of course assumed to
be separated in space. The state of the particle to be teleported is jΨpi = ∑d−10 αijii.





αiji, j, ji (40)





αiji, i + j, ji (41)



































Figure 5: Generalizing quantum algorithms to qudits
which means that when Alice measures the particle and her state in the state jk, si,
Bob’s state is projected to jk,si. At this step Alice can inform Bob the pair (k,s)
and Bob can retrieve the state of the particle by acting on his state by U−s,−k:




The inverse of this process, that is dense coding can obviously be carried out similarly
with d level states.
5.2 Simple Quantum Algorithms for d-level Systems
With the simple circuit of g. (5), we can generalize various simple algorithms with
slight modications in the proofs to the case of qudits. As a simple example we
show how the generalization of Deutch [18], Deutch-Josza [19], and the Bernstein-
Vazirani[20] Problems are solved for qudits.
If we restrict ourselves to linear function f(x) = a  x+ b from Znd to Zd (the number
of which is dn+1 compared to the total of dd
n
functions), then the coecient of the
linear term a 2 Znd , can be determined with certainty, by one call of the oracle. In
fact it is quite easy to see that the output state of the circuit in g. (5) is modulo an



















Hence measuring the rst register gives the exact value of the coecient a. Inciden-
tally this shows that the generalization of the Bernstein-Vazirani problem, which is
to determine by one call of the oracle, the value of a in the function f(x) = a x, can
also be solved by the same circuit.
Note that as far as functions from Z2 to Z2 are concerned, all functions are linear
f(x) = a1x + a0, and the value of a1 determines if they are constant (a1 = 0) or
balanced (a1 = 1). This is the simple Deutch problem.
We can also adhere to the literal interpretation of the Deutch-Josza algorithm and
this time restrict ourselves to the subset of constant or balanced functions and again
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determine by one call of the oracle if the function is constant or balanced. (Note that
by a balanced function we mean jIkj  jfxjf(x) = kgj = independent of k.)
















If the function is constant then this output state, when passed through the Hadamard
gate gives j0ij−i, and thus the measurement of the rst register gives with certainty
the value 0. However if the function is balanced it will yield all values except 0. In
fact we can rewrite
∑
x ζ





























ζk) = 0 (51)
The Simon problem can be stated and solved for qudits quite similarly to the above.
Therefore as far as quantum algorithms and quantum circuits are concerned, there is
a uniform method of treating qudits for any d, including d = 2. One needs to replace
the CNOT and the Hadamard gates appropriately.
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